The real effects of corruption on M&A flows: Evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign
Chenghao Huang,
Zhi Jin,
Siyang Tian and
Eliza Wu
Journal of Banking & Finance, 2023, vol. 150, issue C
Abstract:
We exploit the public enforcement of the anti-corruption campaign across China to identify a causal role of political corruption in corporate takeover flows through a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis. We find that a reduction in corruption increases cross-region takeover activities by 40% and that deal volume more than doubles. Further analyses reveal that treatment effects are more evident for non-SOEs, politically unconnected acquirers, and acquirers that are less corrupt ex ante. We also show that the impact of the anti-corruption campaign is more pronounced in segmented cities where corruption practices are more entrenched. The reduction in corruption leads to higher bidder returns, improves post-acquisition performance, and markedly strengthens local economic development. The evidence indicates that the anti-corruption campaign was effective in attracting inbound corporate investments and supporting economic growth.
Keywords: Takeovers; Corruption; Institutional quality; Corporate investment; Real Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 G32 G34 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:150:y:2023:i:c:s0378426623000407
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106815
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