Stress tests and information disclosure: An experimental analysis

Caleb Cox, Douglas Davis, Oleg Korenok and John Lightle

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2023, vol. 154, issue C

Abstract: To improve the stability of the banking system the Dodd-Frank Act mandates that central banks conduct periodic evaluations of banks’ financial conditions. An intensely debated aspect of these ‘stress tests’ regards how much of that information generated by stress tests should be disclosed to financial markets. This paper uses an environment constructed from a model by Goldstein and Leitner (2018) to gain some behavioral insight into the policy tradeoffs associated with disclosure. Experimental results indicate that variations in disclosure conditions are sensitive to overbidding for bank assets. Absent overbidding, however, optimal disclosure robustly improves risk sharing even when banks behave non-optimally.

Keywords: Optimal disclosure; Stress tests; Bank regulation; Laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D82 G1 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426622002710
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:154:y:2023:i:c:s0378426622002710

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106691

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Banking & Finance is currently edited by Ike Mathur

More articles in Journal of Banking & Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().