US political corruption and quarterly conference calls

Lamia Chourou, Ashrafee T. Hossain and Anand Jha

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2024, vol. 161, issue C

Abstract: We find that managers obfuscate during conference calls when their firm's headquarters is in a politically corrupt state, and they do so to shield assets from corrupt officials. The positive association between corruption and obfuscation by managers is much stronger when the expropriation risks are higher, such as when the firm (a) does not pay dividends, (b) is making a profit, (c) has more cash, (d) has fewer subsidiaries, and (e) is not making any political contributions. We do not find evidence that managers obfuscate during conference calls to hide their self-dealing.

Keywords: Obfuscation; Conference calls; Political corruption; Rent‑seeking; Shielding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 G34 H7 M40 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:161:y:2024:i:c:s0378426624000281

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107108

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