Torn between two debt types? The role of managerial ability in a firmʼs choice between bank loans and public debt

Muhammad Kabir, Dewan Rahman and Taher Jamil

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2024, vol. 164, issue C

Abstract: Motivated by the theoretical literature on firms' choice between bank loans and public debt, this paper analyzes whether more able managers choose a higher fraction of public debt. We find that firms with more able managers choose a higher level of public debt. We also find that the use of public debt by more able managers is positively associated with wealth creation for shareholders and negatively associated with bankruptcy risk. Our cross-sectional analyses suggest that this baseline relationship is conditional on a better information environment. We address endogeneity issues in multiple ways and run an extensive array of robustness checks. Overall, our findings are consistent with the prediction that managerial ability mitigates the information monopoly of banks.

Keywords: Managerial ability; Bank debt; Public debt; Monitoring; Agency problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 G3 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:164:y:2024:i:c:s0378426624001225

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107205

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