Markets and institutions in financial intermediation: National characteristics as determinants
Raj Aggarwal and
John Goodell
Journal of Banking & Finance, 2009, vol. 33, issue 10, 1770-1780
Abstract:
Given the importance of financial intermediation and the rise of globalization, there is little prior research on how national preferences for financial intermediation (markets versus institutions) are determined by cultural, legal, and other national characteristics. Using panel analysis for data on a recent 8-year period for 30 countries, this paper documents that national preferences for market financing increase with political stability, societal openness, economic inequality, and equity market concentration, and decreases with regulatory quality and ambiguity aversion. We confirm with robustness tests that our result for regulatory quality is independent of differences in national wealth and that our result for political stability is independent of both wealth and political legitimacy. These results should be of much interest to managers, scholars, regulators, and policy makers.
Keywords: Financial; institutions; Banks; Financial; markets; Universal; banks; Comparative; financial; systems; Legal; traditions; Uncertainty; avoidance; Trust; Property; rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (109)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:33:y:2009:i:10:p:1770-1780
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