The effect of mergers on credit union performance
Keldon J. Bauer,
Linda L. Miles and
Takeshi Nishikawa
Journal of Banking & Finance, 2009, vol. 33, issue 12, 2267-2274
Abstract:
The motivation for mergers in the credit union industry differs from the commercial bank industry due to the lack of residual claimants to benefit from wealth gains. In the cooperative ownership environment of credit unions, the owners/members gain utility via the rates offered for loans and deposits. Credit union regulators also gain utility when mergers remove risky credit unions from the industry. We measure these utility gains using the event study method of Bauer [Bauer, K., 2008. Detecting abnormal credit union performance. Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 573-586] employing quadrant tests based on a multivariate test of equality of centroids. We find gains to the owners/members of the target credit union and to the regulators but not to the acquiring firm. We posit that the acquiring credit unions may encounter regulatory pressure to merge. In addition, the owners/members of the acquiring firm may avoid potential disutility in the cooperative insurance environment were the target firm allowed to fail.
Keywords: Mergers; Credit; unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:33:y:2009:i:12:p:2267-2274
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