Managerial rights, use of investment banks, and the wealth effects for acquiring firms' shareholders

Weishen Wang and Ann Marie Whyte

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2010, vol. 34, issue 1, 44-54

Abstract: We examine the relation between managerial rights in acquiring firms and the decision to use an investment bank in merger and acquisition deals, and explore whether this relation impacts the wealth effects for acquiring firms' shareholders. We find that acquiring firms whose managers have relatively strong rights are more likely to use investment banks to facilitate deals and are more likely to use reputable banks. The wealth effects to acquiring firms are inversely related to the use of investment banks when managerial rights are relatively strong. However, the wealth loss is mitigated when acquiring firms use reputable investment banks.

Keywords: Investment; banking; Mergers; and; acquisitions; Shareholder; rights; Wealth; effects; Managerial; rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:34:y:2010:i:1:p:44-54

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