Dominant institutional owners and firm value

María Victoria Ruiz-Mallorquí and Domingo J. Santana-Martín

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2011, vol. 35, issue 1, 118-129

Abstract: This research analyzes the impact of control by dominant institutional owners (banking institutions and investment funds) on firm value. The analysis considers the level of voting rights in the hands of the dominant institutional owner and other large shareholders. The results reveal a different effect on value depending on whether the dominant institutional investor is a banking institution or an investment fund. Moreover, the results show that the presence of other large shareholders affects firm value when a dominant institutional owner controls the firm.

Keywords: Institutional; investors; Value; Voting; rights; Banks; Investment; funds; Coalitions; Contestability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:35:y:2011:i:1:p:118-129

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