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Small business groups enhance performance and promote stability, not expropriation. Evidence from French SMEs

Anaïs Hamelin

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2011, vol. 35, issue 3, 613-626

Abstract: This paper investigates the influence that a firm's distance from control has on its performance, using balance sheet information and a unique data set on small business ownership. This study fills a gap in the empirical governance literature by investigating whether there is expropriation of minority shareholders in small business groups. Contrary to observations for large business groups, results show a positive relationship between the separation of control from ownership and firm performance. Results also underline that tunneling promotes controlling shareholders' profit stability rather than profit maximization in small business groups.

Keywords: Ownership; Control; Tunneling; Small; business; Performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Small business groups enhance performance and promote stability, not expropriation. Evidence from French SMEs (2011)
Working Paper: Small business groups enhance performance and promote stability, not expropriation. Evidence from French SMEs (2010) Downloads
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