Convergent synergies in the global market for corporate control

Jeff Madura, Thanh Ngo and Ariel Viale

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2011, vol. 35, issue 9, 2468-2478

Abstract: We investigate the informational role of the takeover premium as a forward looking price to expected synergies in the global market for corporate control. We find that premiums paid in the global market for corporate control are clustered in waves and driven to some extent by the US premium. International takeover premiums have become more responsive to US premiums as the globalization process evolved over time. Short-run divergent dynamics due to idiosyncratic or country-specific factors have become less severe, which suggests that expected synergies have become increasingly integrated in the global market for corporate control. Furthermore, we find that the region's takeover premiums typically become more responsive to US takeover premiums when US economic conditions are relatively weak, when the US monetary policy is restrictive, when US credit risk is high, and when the region's corporate governance (as measured by legal system quality and accounting quality) is high.

Keywords: Cross-border; takeovers; Takeover; premiums; Merger; waves (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:35:y:2011:i:9:p:2468-2478

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