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Cash holdings in private firms

Marco Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal, Javier

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2012, vol. 36, issue 1, 26-35

Abstract: Evidence from a wide sample of Italian private firms shows that cash holdings are significantly related with smaller size, higher risk and lower effective tax rates, therefore supporting predictions from the trade-off model. More cash is also held by firms with longer cash conversion cycles and lower financing deficits, as predicted by the financing hierarchy theory. Reported evidence also shows that dividend payments are associated with more cash holdings, and both bank debt and net working capital represent good cash-substitutes. When controlling for macroeconomic and industry factors, some variables lose their significance, but the general findings are confirmed. Finally, cash-rich companies are found to be more profitable, to pay more dividends and to invest more in a medium-term future horizon.

Keywords: Cash holdings; Cash determinants; Private firms; Trade-off model; Pecking order theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G31 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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