Corporate governance and capital allocations of diversified firms
Sheng-Syan Chen and
Journal of Banking & Finance, 2012, vol. 36, issue 2, 395-409
We examine how various aspects of corporate governance structures affect the capital allocation inefficiency that drives the value discounts of diversified firms. Diversified firms with more effective internal or external governance mechanisms experience more efficient investment allocations at both the firm and segment levels and show less of a diversification discount. The efficiency of the investment allocation process is better for diversified firms with high board independence, low board busyness, high institutional ownership, high outside director ownership, high CEO equity-based pay, high audit quality, and strong shareholder rights. The results hold after controlling for other potential influences. Our evidence suggests that corporate governance considerations are important in assessing the relation between investment efficiency and firm value for diversified firms.
Keywords: Corporate governance; Investment efficiency; Diversification discount (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G31 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:36:y:2012:i:2:p:395-409
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