Missing elements in US financial reform: A Kübler-Ross interpretation of the inadequacy of the Dodd-Frank Act

Edward Kane

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2012, vol. 36, issue 3, 654-661

Abstract: The success of any treatment plan depends on how completely the problems it targets have been diagnosed. The precrisis bubble in securitization can be traced to incentive conflict that allows national safety nets to subsidize leveraged risk-taking. Safety-net subsidies encouraged regulation-induced innovations that enabled firms to take hard-to-monitor risks and to make themselves politically, administratively, and economically difficult for government officials to fail and unwind.

Keywords: Dodd-Frank Act; Financial reform; Safety-net subsidies; Financial crises; Regulatory capture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:36:y:2012:i:3:p:654-661

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.05.020

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