Capital incentives and adequacy for securitizations

Daniel Rösch and Harald Scheule

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2012, vol. 36, issue 3, 733-748

Abstract: This paper analyzes the capital incentives and adequacy of financial institutions for asset portfolio securitizations. The empirical analysis is based on US securitization rating and impairment data. The paper finds that regulatory capital rules for securitizations may be insufficient to cover implied losses during economic downturns such as the Global Financial Crisis. In addition, the rating process of securitizations provides capital arbitrage incentives for financial institutions and may further reduce regulatory capital requirements. These policy-relevant findings assume that the ratings assigned by rating agencies are correct and can be used to build a test for the ability of Basel capital regulations to cover downturn losses.

Keywords: Bank capital; Financial crisis; Rating; Securitization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 G20 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:36:y:2012:i:3:p:733-748

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.02.026

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