Do CEOs gain more in foreign acquisitions than domestic acquisitions?
Neslihan Ozkan
Journal of Banking & Finance, 2012, vol. 36, issue 4, 1122-1138
Abstract:
This paper examines the impact of domestic and foreign acquisitions on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation packages using a sample of 147 completed bids by UK companies from 1999 to 2005. We find that foreign acquisitions lead to higher CEO compensation than domestic acquisitions. Overall, our findings suggest that CEOs have strong incentives to do foreign acquisitions rather than domestic acquisitions since they receive larger compensation following a foreign acquisition regardless of how poor firm performance is. Furthermore, we observe a positive and significant relation between CEO compensation and firm size during the pre-acquisition period for firms involved in foreign acquisitions, thus their CEOs would expect to increase their compensation package through foreign acquisitions. However, our results show that there is no significant link between firm size and CEO compensation during the pre-acquisition period for firms involved in domestic acquisitions.
Keywords: CEO compensation; Domestic acquisitions; Foreign acquisitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426611003505
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:36:y:2012:i:4:p:1122-1138
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.12.005
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Banking & Finance is currently edited by Ike Mathur
More articles in Journal of Banking & Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().