Supervisors as information producers: Do stress tests reduce bank opaqueness?
Giovanni Petrella and
Journal of Banking & Finance, 2013, vol. 37, issue 12, 5406-5420
Supervisory stress tests assess the impact of an adverse macroeconomic scenario on the profitability and capitalisation of a large number of banks. The results of such stress test exercises have recently been disclosed to the public in an attempt to restore confidence and to curb bank opaqueness by helping investors distinguish between sound and fragile institutions. In an unprecedented effort for transparency, the 2011 European Union stress test lead to the release of some 3400 data points for each of the 90 participating banks. This makes it an ideal setting to investigate a number of hypotheses on the information role of the stress tests.
Keywords: Stress tests; Financial crises; Bank opaqueness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G14 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:37:y:2013:i:12:p:5406-5420
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