Economics at your fingertips  

Supervisors as information producers: Do stress tests reduce bank opaqueness?

Giovanni Petrella and Andrea Resti

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2013, vol. 37, issue 12, 5406-5420

Abstract: Supervisory stress tests assess the impact of an adverse macroeconomic scenario on the profitability and capitalisation of a large number of banks. The results of such stress test exercises have recently been disclosed to the public in an attempt to restore confidence and to curb bank opaqueness by helping investors distinguish between sound and fragile institutions. In an unprecedented effort for transparency, the 2011 European Union stress test lead to the release of some 3400 data points for each of the 90 participating banks. This makes it an ideal setting to investigate a number of hypotheses on the information role of the stress tests.

Keywords: Stress tests; Financial crises; Bank opaqueness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G14 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Banking & Finance is currently edited by Ike Mathur

More articles in Journal of Banking & Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

Page updated 2019-01-25
Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:37:y:2013:i:12:p:5406-5420