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Financial supervision regimes and bank efficiency: International evidence

Chrysovalantis Gaganis () and Fotios Pasiouras

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2013, vol. 37, issue 12, 5463-5475

Abstract: There exists a lively debate as for the appropriate architecture of the financial supervision regime, with a long list of theoretical advantages and disadvantages associated with each one of its key dimensions. The present study investigates whether and how bank profit efficiency is influenced by the central bank’s involvement in financial supervision, the unification of financial authorities, and the independence of the central bank. The results show that efficiency decreases as the number of the financial sectors that are supervised by the central bank increases. Additionally, banks operating in countries with greater unification of supervisory authorities are less profit efficient. Finally, central bank independence has a negative impact on bank profit efficiency.

Keywords: Central bank; Efficiency; Independence; Supervision; Unification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:37:y:2013:i:12:p:5463-5475

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.04.026

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