Ironing out the kinks in executive compensation: Linking incentive pay to average stock prices

Yisong S. Tian

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2013, vol. 37, issue 2, 415-432

Abstract: Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces volatility by about 42%, making the incentive pay more attractive to risk-averse executives. Holding the cost of the option grant to the firm constant, Asian stock options are more cost effective than traditional stock options and provide stronger incentives to increase stock price. More importantly, the improvement is achieved with little impact on the option grant’s risk incentives (after adjusting for option cost). Finally, averaging also improves the value and incentive effects of indexed stock options.

Keywords: Executive compensation; Optimal contracting; Executive stock options; Cost effectiveness; Incentive effects; Asian options; Indexed options (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G13 G30 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:37:y:2013:i:2:p:415-432

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.09.025

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