Crossing takeover premiums and mix of payment: An empirical test of contractual setting in M&A transactions

Hubert de La Bruslerie

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2013, vol. 37, issue 6, 2106-2123

Abstract: The analyses of the tender offer premiums and of the means of payment should not be performed separately. In the empirical literature, these two variables are often considered independently, although they may have an endogenous relationship in a contractual setting. Using a sample of European M&As over the 2000–2010 decade, we show that these two variables are jointly set in a contractual empirical approach. The relationship between the percentage of cash and the offer premium is positive: higher premiums yield payments with more cash.

Keywords: M&A; Takeover premium; Means of payment; Contract setting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Crossing takeover premiums and mix of payment: An empirical test of contractual setting in M&A transactions (2013)
Working Paper: Crossing takeover premiums and mix of payment: An empirical test of contractual setting in M&A transactions (2012)
Working Paper: Crossing takeover premiums and mix of payment: Empirical test of contractual setting in M&A transactions (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:37:y:2013:i:6:p:2106-2123

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.01.037

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