Greasing the wheels of bank lending: Evidence from private firms in China
Ming Liu and
Journal of Banking & Finance, 2013, vol. 37, issue 7, 2533-2545
Bribery, rather than firm performance, largely determines the extent to which private firms access bank credit in China. Bribery enables an economic outcome whereby firms with better economic performance are awarded larger loans. These firms also pay more in terms of bribes. Although satisfactory firm performance does determine whether firms can access loans, it does so only for loans originated by the big-four banks. For loans originated by smaller banks, performance is not essential for firms to secure loan access. Our evidence sheds light on the surprising finding of earlier studies that Chinese banks use commercial logic in their lending practices despite being endowed with a weak institutional framework.
Keywords: Corruption; Bank lending; Alternative governance mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C13 G12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (13) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:37:y:2013:i:7:p:2533-2545
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Banking & Finance is currently edited by Ike Mathur
More articles in Journal of Banking & Finance from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Dana Niculescu ().