Securitization, competition and monitoring

Jung-Hyun Ahn and Régis Breton ()

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2014, vol. 40, issue C, 195-210

Abstract: We analyze the impact of loan securitization on competition in the loan market. Using a dynamic loan market competition model where borrowers face both exogenous and endogenous costs to switch between banks, we uncover a competition softening effect of securitization that allows banks to extract rents in the primary loan market. By reducing monitoring incentives, securitization mitigates winner’s curse effects in future stages of competition thereby decreasing ex ante competition for initial market share. Due to this competition softening effect, securitization can adversely affect loan market efficiency while leading to higher equilibrium profits for banks. This effect is driven by primary loan market competition, not by the exploitation of informational asymmetries in the secondary market for loans. We also argue that banks can use securitization as a strategic response to an increase in competition, as a tool to signal a reduction in monitoring intensity for the sole purpose of softening ex ante competition. Our result suggests that securitization reforms focusing exclusively on informational asymmetries in markets for securitized products may overlook competitive conditions in the primary market.

Keywords: Securitization; Loan sales; Banking competition; Monitoring; Rent extraction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 L12 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Working Paper: Securitization, competition and monitoring (2014)
Working Paper: Securitization, Competition and Monitoring (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:40:y:2014:i:c:p:195-210

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.11.023

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