Economics at your fingertips  

The Chrysler effect: The impact of government intervention on borrowing costs

Deniz Anginer () and A. Joseph Warburton

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2014, vol. 40, issue C, 62-79

Abstract: This paper studies intercreditor conflict arising from political interference in the bankruptcy process. The U.S. government’s intervention in the 2009 reorganizations of Chrysler and GM purportedly elevated claims of the auto union over those of the automakers’ senior creditors in violation of bankruptcy priority rules. Critics predicted that businesses would experience an increase in their borrowing costs because of the risk that politically-powerful junior claimants might now leap-frog other creditors. We examine the financial market where this effect would be most detectible, the market for bonds of highly unionized companies. We find no evidence that bondholders of unionized firms reacted negatively to the government intervention and reject the claim that investors viewed the reorganizations as establishing a precedent for priority jumping by organized labor.

Keywords: Chrysler; General Motors; Bankruptcy; TARP; Government intervention; Bailout; Cost of capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G33 G38 K2 K22 J5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.11.006

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Banking & Finance is currently edited by Ike Mathur

More articles in Journal of Banking & Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haili He ().

Page updated 2021-02-08
Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:40:y:2014:i:c:p:62-79