Systemic banks and the lender of last resort

Jorge Ponce and Marc Rennert

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2015, vol. 50, issue C, 286-297

Abstract: We propose a model where systemic and non-systemic banks are exposed to liquidity shortfalls so that a lender of last resort policy is required. We find that it is socially optimal to override the decision of the central bank by the unconditional provision of liquidity support when the shortfall is large enough, i.e. in crisis times. The existence of systemic banks provides a rationale for the central bank to act as lender of last resort for non-systemic banks in a larger range of their liquidity shortfalls. However, the impact of systemic risk on the optimal allocation of the lender of last resort responsibilities for systemic banks depends on the relative size of counteracting effects.

Keywords: Systemic banks; Lender of last resort policy; Optimal regulatory architecture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Systemic banks and the lender of last resort (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:50:y:2015:i:c:p:286-297

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.01.002

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