Privatization, financial development, property rights and growth
Isaac Marcelin and
Ike Mathur
Journal of Banking & Finance, 2015, vol. 50, issue C, 528-546
Abstract:
This study analyzes how prevailing institutional arrangements i.e., property rights, contracting rights, political institutions, and corporate governance practices affect privatized firms’ performance, capital markets development, and economic growth. Most of the studies surveyed show that privatization enhances privatized firms performance, efficiency, and profitability, which percolates to economic growth. Privatized firms performed better in countries with better regulatory and legal frameworks. Partial privatization may be beneficial in countries with weak institutions, namely, the French civil law countries. The stronger the economic and the governing institutions, the easier it is for privatized firms to thrive and contribute to economic growth. Overall, privatization allows firms to achieve improved efficiency while driving the development of the financial sector.
Keywords: Privatization; Property rights; Contracting rights; Financial development; Political institutions; Law and finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 L33 L38 O34 P14 P16 P26 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:50:y:2015:i:c:p:528-546
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.034
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