China's “Mercantilist” Government Subsidies, the Cost of Debt and Firm Performance

Chu Yeong Lim, Jiwei Wang () and Zeng, Cheng (Colin)

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2018, vol. 86, issue C, 37-52

Abstract: China has been adopting a “mercantilist” policy by lavishing massive government subsidies on Chinese firms. Using hand-collected subsidy data on Chinese listed companies, we find that firms receiving more subsidies tend to have a lower cost of debt. However, such firms fail to have superior financial performance. Instead, firms with more subsidies tend to be overstaffed, which demonstrates higher social performance. These results are mainly driven by non-tax-based subsidies rather than tax-based subsidies. Overall, our results suggest that the Chinese government uses non-tax-based subsidies to achieve its social policy objectives at the expense of firms’ profitability.

Keywords: Government subsidies; Cost of debt; Firm performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G38 H25 H71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:86:y:2018:i:c:p:37-52

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.09.004

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