An examination of the relation between strategic interaction among industry firms and firm performance
Tumennasan Bayar,
Marcia Millon Cornett,
Otgontsetseg Erhemjamts,
Ty Leverty and
Hassan Tehranian
Journal of Banking & Finance, 2018, vol. 87, issue C, 248-263
Abstract:
This paper examines the relation between the degree and type of strategic interaction among industry firms and firm performance. As a measure of firm performance, we use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to estimate the efficiency of a firm relative to the ‘best practice’ firms in its industry. We find that firms in industries with higher levels of strategic interaction are less efficient and the negative relation is more pronounced in industries where firms compete in strategic substitutes. This finding is consistent with the idea that there is significantly more cooperation (tacit collusion) under strategic complements than strategic substitutes. We also find that frontier efficiency methodology outperforms other measures of firm performance in explaining the relation between strategic interaction and firm performance.
Keywords: Industry structure; Strategic interaction; Strategic complements; Strategic substitutes; Firm efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G10 G30 L11 L22 L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426617302558
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:87:y:2018:i:c:p:248-263
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.10.009
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Banking & Finance is currently edited by Ike Mathur
More articles in Journal of Banking & Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().