 Do players perform for pay? An empirical examination via NFL players’ compensation contractsSeoyoung Kim, Atulya Sarin and Saagar Sarin Journal of Banking & Finance, 2018, vol. 88, issue C, 330-346 Abstract: How to properly compensate and incentivize players is an important question in the realm of professional sports, and more broadly, is a central question in contract design. With the increasing use of performance-based compensation packages and tax law favoring such compensation design, a natural question arises as to whether workers do indeed perform for pay. We examine this question in a setting that is not fraught with the typical measurement and identification problems found in many pay-performance settings. Specifically, we examine changes in a NFL player's Win Probability Added (WPA) and Expected Points Added (EPA) in response to his compensation-contract design. Overall, our paper provides evidence that players do indeed perform for (properly designed) pay, and has important implications for future work on compensation and incentive-based contract design. Keywords: Pay-performance sensitivity; Incentive-based compensation; NFL / sports compensation; Win Probability Added (WPA); Expected Points Added (EPA); Sports analytics (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:88:y:2018:i:c:p:330-346 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.01.004 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Banking & Finance is currently edited by Ike Mathur More articles in Journal of Banking & Finance from Elsevier |
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