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How much is too much? Large termination fees and target distress

Jordan Neyland and Chander Shekhar

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2018, vol. 88, issue C, 97-112

Abstract: We provide evidence that large termination fees mitigate contracting problems in acquisitions of targets with high information asymmetry. Large fees are more common if targets face financial constraints or distress. Deals with large termination fees are less likely to be consummated, consistent with large fees allowing acquirers to recover bidding costs when facing a high risk of bid failure. We correct for the endogenous selection of large termination fees and present evidence that managers negotiate large fees in exchange for higher premiums. This is in contrast with prior evidence that suggests large fees result from managerial self-interest and harm target shareholders.

Keywords: Merger; Acquisition; Termination fee; Information asymmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:88:y:2018:i:c:p:97-112