Diversification and tunneling: Evidence from Indian business groups

Raja Kali and Jayati Sarkar

Journal of Comparative Economics, 2011, vol. 39, issue 3, 349-367

Abstract: We provide evidence suggesting an important yet largely unexplored motive for the diversified structure of emerging economy business groups is to facilitate expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling insiders through tunneling. Using firm level panel data from India, and defining the core firm of a group as the one with the largest asset base, we find that the relatedness of the activity of a group affiliate to the activity of the core firm is correlated with the wedge between control and cash flow rights of insiders as well as with the opacity in insider ownership. Firms with ownership-control wedge lower and ownership opacity higher relative to a group's core firm are more likely to be in activities unrelated to that of the core firm. Our findings are strengthened by evidence of tunneling in the same direction, from affiliates with wedge equal to or higher than that of the core firm to affiliates with wedge lower than that of the core firm. Taken together this suggests an expropriation motive for diversification: affiliate firms are located away from a business group's core firm to serve as destination points for funds tunneled from the group's core.

Keywords: Business; groups; Diversification; Tunneling; Separation; of; ownership; and; control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596711000230
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:39:y:2011:i:3:p:349-367

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Comparative Economics is currently edited by D. Berkowitz and G. Roland

More articles in Journal of Comparative Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().