Institutional determinants of military spending

Daniel Albalate, Germà Bel and Ferran Elias ()

Journal of Comparative Economics, 2012, vol. 40, issue 2, 279-290

Abstract: Drawing on a database for 1988–2006 containing information on 157 countries, we investigate the effects on military spending of government form and democracy, electoral rules and concentration of parliamentary parties. From an OLS regression on pooled data, our results show that presidential democracies spend more than parliamentary systems on defense, whereas its interaction with a majoritarian electoral rule reduces the defense burden. Our findings suggest that, in contrast to theoretical predictions in the literature, institutions do not have the same impact on the provision of all public goods.

Keywords: Military spending; Politics; Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H41 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (55)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Institutional Determinants of Military Spending (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:40:y:2012:i:2:p:279-290

DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2011.12.006

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