Club-in-the-club: Reform under unanimity
Erik Berglof (),
Mike Burkart (),
Guido Friebel () and
Elena Paltseva ()
Journal of Comparative Economics, 2012, vol. 40, issue 3, 492-507
In many organizations, decisions are taken by unanimity giving each member veto power. We analyze a model of an organization in which members with heterogenous productivity privately contribute to a common good. Under unanimity, the least efficient member imposes her preferred effort choice on the entire organization. The threat of forming an “inner organization” can undermine the veto power of the less efficient members and coerce them to exert more effort. We also identify the conditions under which the threat of forming an inner organization is executed. Finally, we show that majority rules effectively prevent the emergence of inner organizations.
Keywords: D2; D7; P4; Organizations; Club good; Voting rules; EU integration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Club-in-the-club: reform under unanimity (2012)
Working Paper: Club-in-the-Club: Reform under Unanimity (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:40:y:2012:i:3:p:492-507
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