Selection of public servants into politics

Thomas Braendle and Alois Stutzer

Journal of Comparative Economics, 2016, vol. 44, issue 3, 696-719

Abstract: Countries differ substantially in how they deal with politicians that come from the public sector. Most constitutions include incompatibility and ineligibility rules due to concerns about conflicts of interest and the politicization of the public service. We study how these rules affect the attractiveness of parliamentary mandates for public servants and thus the selection into politics. We compile a novel dataset that captures the fraction of public servants in 76 national legislatures as well as the respective (in)compatibility regimes. On average, there are seven percentage points fewer public servants in parliaments where a strict regime is in force. Supplementary evidence based on IV estimations shows that the fraction of public servants in parliament is positively correlated with government consumption, but not correlated with government effectiveness.

Keywords: Political selection; Public servants; Incompatibility; Political representation; Compensation of politicians; Government consumption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 K39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Selection of Public Servants into Politics (2015)
Working Paper: Selection of Public Servants into Politics (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:44:y:2016:i:3:p:696-719

DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2015.11.005

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