The clan and the corporation: Sustaining cooperation in China and Europe

Avner Greif and Guido Tabellini

Journal of Comparative Economics, 2017, vol. 45, issue 1, 1-35

Abstract: Over the last millennium, the clan and the corporation have been the loci of cooperation in China and Europe respectively. This paper examines – analytically and historically – the cultural and institutional co-evolution that led to this bifurcation. We highlight that groups with which individuals identify are basic units of cooperation. Such loyalty groups influence institutional development because intra-group moral commitment reduces enforcement cost implying a comparative advantage in pursuing collective actions. Loyalty groups perpetuate due to positive feedbacks between morality, institutions, and the implied pattern of cooperation.

Keywords: Institutions; Culture; China; Europe; Economic development; Economic history (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (105)

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Working Paper: The Clan and the Corporation: Sustaining Cooperation in China and Europe (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:45:y:2017:i:1:p:1-35

DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2016.12.003

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