Corruption for sales
Mathieu Couttenier () and
Journal of Comparative Economics, 2017, vol. 45, issue 1, 56-66
This paper investigates the impact of corruption on foreign affiliates’ sales of German multinationals that differ in their level of experience in the foreign market. We exploit the panel dimension of a detailed firm-level dataset to show that more experienced firms are less likely to suffer from the costs related to corruption. Controlling for persistent and unobserved factors at the country and firm levels, we show that corruption reduces unambiguously the sales of new entering firms, while having no impact on the sales of incumbents.
Keywords: Multinational firms; Corruption; FDI (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F44 F23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: Corruption for Sales (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:45:y:2017:i:1:p:56-66
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Comparative Economics is currently edited by D. Berkowitz and G. Roland
More articles in Journal of Comparative Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().