Lame ducks and divided government: How voters control the unaccountable

Mark Schelker

Journal of Comparative Economics, 2018, vol. 46, issue 1, 131-144

Abstract: Electoral institutions interact through the incentives they provide to policy makers and voters. In this paper divided government is interpreted as the reaction of voters to a systematic control problem. Voters realize that term-limited executives (“lame ducks”) cannot credibly commit to a moderate electoral platform due to missing reelection incentives. By dividing government control voters force a lame duck to compromise on policies with an opposing legislature. Based on data from the US states, I present evidence showing that the probability of divided government is about 8 to 10 percent higher when governors are lame ducks.

Keywords: Divided government; Lame duck; Term limit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable (2012)
Working Paper: Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:46:y:2018:i:1:p:131-144

DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2017.02.005

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