Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

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Volume 230, issue C, 2025

The evolution of resilience

David K. Levine

Mean-field approximation of forward-looking population dynamics

Ryota Iijima and Daisuke Oyama

Bad reputation due to incompetent expert

Weicheng Min

Credit conditions, inflation, and unemployment

Chao Gu, Janet Hua Jiang and Liang Wang

Misspecified learning and evolutionary stability

Kevin He and Jonathan Libgober

Targeting network intervention with social norm

Dawen Meng

Learning under ambiguity: An experimental investigation

M. Abdellaoui, B. Hill, E. Kemel and H. Maafi

Quantifying the inefficiency of multi-unit auctions for normal goods

Simon Essig Aberg and Brian Baisa

Auctions with tokens: Monetary policy as a mechanism design choice

Andrea Canidio

Coordinating charitable donations with Leontief preferences

Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi and Warut Suksompong

Mixture-betweenness: Uncertainty and commitment

Fernando Payró

Credible sets

Mert Kimya

Market design with distributional objectives: Efficiency, incentives, and property rights

Isa E. Hafalir, Fuhito Kojima and M. Bumin Yenmez

Actions and signals

Thomas Jungbauer and Michael Waldman

Informational frictions in funding and credit markets

Michael Sockin

Persuasion with verifiable information

Maria Titova and Kun Zhang

Endogenous business cycles in overlapping generations models with time inconsistency

Eungsik Kim and Jiayi Li

Incomplete financial markets, the social cost of carbon and constrained efficient carbon pricing

Felix Kubler

HANK on speed: Robust nonlinear solutions using automatic differentiation

Gregor Boehl

On the timing of moves in two-player games

Larry Karp, Robert C. Schmidt, Leo Simon and Leanne Streekstra

Welfare and distributional effects of joint intervention in networks

Ryan Kor, Yi Liu, Yves Zenou and Junjie Zhou

Corrigendum to “Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture” [Journal of Economic Theory 185 (2020) 104951]

Ingela Alger, Jörgen W. Weibull and Laurent Lehmann

Volume 229, issue C, 2025

Reputation and the credibility of inflation plans

Rumen Kostadinov and Francisco Roldán

Social learning through coarse signals of others' actions

Wenji Xu

Dynamic consistency in games without expected utility

Andrés Perea

Information agreements

Kemal Kıvanç Aköz and Arseniy Samsonov

Biased mediation: Selection and effectiveness

Jin Yeub Kim and Jong Jae Lee

Spontaneous discrimination with endogenous information disclosure

Arno Apffelstaedt

A dynamic Roy model of academic specialization

Titan Alon and Daniel Fershtman

Volume 228, issue C, 2025

Climate payments: A Coase theorem

Prajit K. Dutta and Roy Radner

Bargaining under liquidity constraints: Experimental evidence

John Duffy, Lucie Lebeau and Daniela Puzzello

New fertility patterns: The role of human versus physical capital

Nicolas Abad, Johanna Etner, Natacha Raffin and Thomas Seegmuller

Stationary altruism and time consistency

Antoine Billot and Xiangyu Qu

Never say never: Optimal exclusion and reserve prices with expectations-based loss-averse buyers

Benjamin Balzer and Antonio Rosato

The rich are not like you and me: Income, price dispersion, and consumption

Eungsik Kim and Stephen Spear

Meritocracy versus diversity

Kenzo Imamura

Two time-consistent Paretian solutions to the intertemporal resource allocation problem

Yves Sprumont

Undominated monopoly regulation

Debasis Mishra and Sanket Patil

Money and imperfectly competitive credit

Allen Head, Timothy Kam, Sam Ng and Guangqian Pan

Unidirectional incentive compatibility

Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz

Monopoly pricing with optimal information

Guilherme Carmona and Krittanai Laohakunakorn

Market versus optimum allocation in open economies

Peter H. Egger and Ruobing Huang

Public goods in networks: Comparative statics results

Sebastian Bervoets and Kohmei Makihara

Public goods, social alternatives, and the Lindahl-VCG relationship

David Delacrétaz, Simon Loertscher and Claudio Mezzetti

Information requirements for mechanism design

Richard P. McLean and Andrew Postlewaite

Market design with deferred acceptance: A recipe for characterizations

Battal Doğan, Kenzo Imamura and M. Bumin Yenmez

Persuasion without ex-post commitment

Sophie Kreutzkamp and Yichuan Lou

Targeting in adaptive networks

Timo Hiller

A model of rejection-based decision making

Bhavook Bhardwaj and Kriti Manocha

A revealed preference approach to approximate utility maximisation

Paweł Dziewulski

Correlation concern

Andrew Ellis

Deadlines and matching

Garth Baughman