When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts

Stephen Spear () and Cheng Wang

Journal of Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 120, issue 2, 239-256

Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (76)

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Working Paper: When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts (2005)
Working Paper: When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:120:y:2005:i:2:p:239-256

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