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Bidding for money

Benoit Julien (), John Kennes () and Ian King ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, vol. 142, issue 1, 196-217

Abstract: We analyze monetary exchange in a model that allows for directed search and multilateral matches. We consider environments with divisible goods and indivisible money, and compare the results with those in models that use random matching and bilateral bargaining. Two different pricing mechanisms are used: ex ante price posting, and ex post bidding (auctions). Also, we consider settings both with and without lotteries. We find that the model generates very simple and intuitive equilibrium allocations that are similar to those with random matching and bargaining, but with different comparative static and welfare properties.

Date: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:142:y:2008:i:1:p:196-217