Structural holes in social networks: A remark

Nicolas Houy

Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, vol. 144, issue 1, 422-431

Abstract: In a recent article, [S. Goyal, F. Vega-Redondo, Structural holes in social networks, J. Econ. Theory 137 (1) (2007) 460-492] the authors (GVR) showed the importance of stars and cycles in a given network formation game. Implicitly, in their article, a network is called an equilibrium if it is generated by an equilibrium strategy. We extend the results of GVR to the case of a stronger requirement: namely, that a network can be called an equilibrium only if all the strategies generating it are equilibria. We also show, in a dynamic framework, that both definitions differ in crucial ways.

Keywords: Networks; Network; formation; Structural; holes; Intermediation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:1:p:422-431

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