Imprecise probabilistic beliefs as a context for decision-making under ambiguity
Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, vol. 144, issue 3, 1054-1091
Coherent imprecise probabilistic beliefs are modeled as incomplete comparative likelihood relations admitting a multiple-prior representation. Under a structural assumption of Equidivisibility, we provide an axiomatization of such relations and show uniqueness of the representation. In the second part of the paper, we formulate a behaviorally general "Likelihood Compatibility" axiom relating preferences and probabilistic beliefs and characterize its implications for the class of "invariant biseparable" preferences that includes the MEU and CEU models among others.
Keywords: Ambiguity; Comparative; likelihood; Qualitative; probability; Multiple; priors; Probabilistic; sophistication; Probabilistic; beliefs; Unambiguous; events (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:3:p:1054-1091
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