Search by committee

James Albrecht, Axel Anderson and Susan Vroman

Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, vol. 145, issue 4, 1386-1407

Abstract: We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop is made by a committee and show that a unique symmetric stationary equilibrium exists given a log concave distribution of rewards. We compare search by committee to the corresponding single-agent problem and show that committee members are less picky and more conservative than the single agent. We show how (i) increasing committee size holding the plurality fraction constant and (ii) increasing the plurality rule affect the equilibrium acceptance threshold and expected search duration. Finally, we show that unanimity is optimal if committee members are sufficiently patient.

Keywords: Search; Voting; Committees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022-0531(09)00150-1
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Search by Committee (2007)
Working Paper: Search by Committee (2007)
Working Paper: Search by Committee (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:4:p:1386-1407

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().