Kidney exchange: An egalitarian mechanism
Özgür Yılmaz ()
Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, vol. 146, issue 2, 592-618
Abstract:
Kidney exchange programs utilize both deceased-donor and live-donor kidneys. One of these programs, a two-way kidney paired donation (KPD), involves two patients exchanging their live donors[modifier letter apostrophe] kidneys. Another possibility is a list exchange (LE): a living incompatible donor provides a kidney to a candidate on the deceased-donor waitlist and in return the intended recipient of this donor receives a priority on the waitlist. By taking into consideration the fact that transplants from live donors have a higher chance of success than those from cadavers, we characterize the set of efficient and egalitarian exchanges involving the KPD[modifier letter apostrophe]s and LE[modifier letter apostrophe]s.
Keywords: Mechanism; design; Matching; Kidney; exchange; Random; assignment; Lorenz; dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:2:p:592-618
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