Correlated equilibrium existence for infinite games with type-dependent strategies
Maxwell Stinchcombe ()
Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, vol. 146, issue 2, 638-655
Abstract:
Under study are games in which players receive private signals and then simultaneously choose actions from compact sets. Payoffs are measurable in signals and jointly continuous in actions. This paper gives a counter-example to the main step in Cotter[modifier letter apostrophe]s [K. Cotter, Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies, J. Econ. Theory 54 (1991) 48-69] argument for correlated equilibrium existence for this class of games, and supplies an alternative proof.
Keywords: Infinite; games; Correlated; equilibrium; existence; Informational; commonalities; Nonstandard; analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022-0531(10)00169-9
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:2:p:638-655
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell
More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().