Dynamic coalitional equilibrium
Hannu Vartiainen ()
Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, vol. 146, issue 2, 672-698
We study coalition formation processes of Konishi and Ray (2003) . It is shown that an absorbing and deterministic process of coalition formation that also forms an equilibrium - satisfies a coalitional one-deviation property - does exist if one allows the process to be history dependent. All such dynamic equilibrium processes of coalition formation are characterized. Absorbing outcomes of dynamic equilibrium processes are also identified. It is shown that they always constitute a subset of the largest consistent set of Chwe (1994) . A procedure that identifies a dynamic equilibrium process of coalition formation in finite time is constructed.
Keywords: One-deviation; principle; Coalition; formation; History; dependence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:2:p:672-698
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