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Strategic argumentation

Wioletta Dziuda ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, vol. 146, issue 4, 1362-1397

Abstract: I analyze a game between an uninformed decision maker and a possibly biased expert. The expert receives a set of arguments, and each argument favors one of two alternatives. He can disclose each argument credibly, but cannot prove whether he has disclosed everything. In all equilibria, the biased expert sends messages containing arguments both for and against his preferred alternative. However, the decision maker is not influenced by the unfavorable arguments revealed by the biased expert. The latter is able to convince the decision maker to choose the biased expert[modifier letter apostrophe]s preferred alternative only if he reveals sufficiently many favorable arguments.

Keywords: Strategic; communication; Persuasion; Argumentation; Expert; advice; Disclosure; games; Two-sided; messages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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