On efficiency of the English auction

Oleksii Birulin and Sergei Izmalkov ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, vol. 146, issue 4, 1398-1417

Abstract: We study efficiency properties of the irrevocable exit English auction in a setting with interdependent values. Maskin (1992) [1] shows that the pairwise single-crossing condition is sufficient for efficiency of the English auction with two bidders and suggests that it is also a necessary condition. This paper clarifies and extends Maskin[modifier letter apostrophe]s results to the case of N bidders. We introduce the generalized single-crossing condition--a fairly intuitive extension of the pairwise single-crossing condition--and prove that it is essentially a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an efficient equilibrium of the N-bidder English auction.

Keywords: English; auction; Efficient; auction; Ex-post; equilibrium; Single-crossing; Interdependent; values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On Effciency of the English Auction (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:4:p:1398-1417

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