Minimal stable sets in tournaments

Felix Brandt

Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, vol. 146, issue 4, 1481-1499

Abstract: We propose a systematic methodology for defining tournament solutions as extensions of maximality. The central concepts of this methodology are maximal qualified subsets and minimal stable sets. We thus obtain an infinite hierarchy of tournament solutions, encompassing the top cycle, the uncovered set, the Banks set, the minimal covering set, and the tournament equilibrium set. Moreover, the hierarchy includes a new tournament solution, the minimal extending set, which is conjectured to refine both the minimal covering set and the Banks set.

Keywords: Tournament; solutions; Stable; sets; Social; choice; theory; Game; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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