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Transferable utility games with uncertainty

Helga Habis and P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, vol. 146, issue 5, 2126-2139

Abstract: We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TU-games are convex.

Keywords: Transferable; utility; games; Uncertainty; Weak; Sequential; Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Working Paper: Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty (2011) Downloads
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