Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games

Ryan Oprea, Keith Henwood and Daniel Friedman

Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, vol. 146, issue 6, 2206-2225

Abstract: Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk–Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were matched in a two-population protocol with the same bimatrix, they showed clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the game. These findings support distinctive predictions of evolutionary game theory.

Keywords: Evolutionary dynamics; Hawk–Dove game; Game theory; Laboratory experiment; Continuous time game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C92 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (63)

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Working Paper: Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from Continuous Time Laboratory Games (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:6:p:2206-2225

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.014

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