Common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in economies with asymmetric information

Elchanan Ben-Porath () and Aviad Heifetz

Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, vol. 146, issue 6, 2608-2626

Abstract: Consider an exchange economy with asymmetric information. What is the set of outcomes that are consistent with common knowledge of rationality and market clearing?

Keywords: Rational expectations; Rationalizability; Common knowledge; Asymmetric information; Exchange economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Common Knowledge of Rationality and Market Clearing in Economies with Asymmetric Information (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:6:p:2608-2626

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.015

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